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Abstract: Dividend policy is one of the widely addressed topics in financial management. It is an important duty of 
a financial manager to formulate the company's dividend policy that is in the best interest of the company. Many a 
time financial managers are involved in earnings management practices with the intention of adjusting dividends. 
The present study has been carried out to scrutinize the effect of earnings management on dividend policy. The 
researchers have taken the data of 86 listed companies for the year 2004 to 2009. The researchers have measured the 
dividend policy by using dividend payout ratio while Modified Cross Sectional Jones Model (1995) has been 
employed to measure the earnings management. The results of the common effect model show that there is not any 
significant relationship among earnings management and dividend policy. Moreover, smaller companies are paying 
more dividends as compared to larger companies. This study reveals that involvement of managers is not for 
dividend policy. There might be some other motives behind the earnings management. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The explanation of dividend policy is one of the main concerns in financial management. It is an important 
responsibility of financial manager to devise dividend policy of the company. Despite the number of studies 
have been conducted on dividend policy, the factors affecting the dividend policy and outcomes of dividend 
policy are still required to be explored. The researchers and practitioners have still to develop a consensus in 
this regard. Black (1976) wrote about the dividend policy, “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the 
more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just do not fit together”. Dividend signaling and capital market 
equilibrium can be helpful in solving the dividend puzzle. The previous studies show that the dividend 
announcement can be helpful in increasing the firm’s value (Koch & Shenoy, 1999; Lee & Xiao, 2003; Guttman, 
Kadan & Kandel, 2008; Hussainey & Aal-Eisa, 2009; Fairchild, 2010). The managers are well aware about the 
future cash flows of the firm. They only announce the dividend if signaling benefit is greater than the 
associated cost (Bhattacharya, 1979).  
 
Miller & Modigilani’s “Irrelevance Theorem” is the starting point for any discussion about dividends. This 
theorem states that investment policy of the firm is predetermined and irreversible. The dividend policy does 
not play any role in the determination of firm’s value. The price of firm’s equity in the market may rise 
proportionately with earnings.  Whereas, in case of distribution of dividends, financing can be obtained by 
means of raising funds in capital market and the value of firm’s equity may decrease proportionally to its 
dividend payout. Therefore, the distribution of dividend does not make any difference for the capital market.  
The shareholders of a firm are always interested in the profitability of firm. The confidence of shareholders is 
boosted up due to high profitability of the firm. They feel encouraged to invest in shares of the companies 
having stable earnings. The shareholders are also interested to know about the earnings of the company as 
they hope to receive dividend if company is earning healthy profits (Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen, 1999). 
The managers are often found involved in earnings management to generate a signal to the shareholders. The 
discussion about the relationship of dividend and earnings was started from the work of Lintner (1956).  The 
managers report their earnings to make the adjustments in dividends. Moreover, the stock prices of a 
company are not directly manipulated by its executives; rather they conduct earnings management practices 
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which in turn affect stock prices (Lindstädt & Seifert, 2006). It is strongly required to protect firms and 
shareholders from the prohibited and detrimental practices of balance sheet manipulation by management. 
  
There are 54,606 limited companies in Pakistan. The total numbers of publicly listed companies are 609.  
These companies operate in 32 different sectors. Pakistan is one of the countries where concentration of 
wealth is the main issue (SECP, 2010). All the top business men tend to explore the business opportunities 
where they can control and lead the matters for their own benefits. This resulted in formation of business 
ventures where family owned entities emerged largely on market screen. In this way, they can appropriate 
major chunk of profits to invest in the business again and thus dividend payouts are reduced to lower level.  
Financial managers control the financial affairs with the objective to arrange more and more funds for 
investment opportunities instead of drawing out profits in shape of dividend, on direction of their top 
management. This in turn bring positive results for family owned businesses where they can use profits for 
investment and make company’s financial position more strong  (Ahmed & Javed, 2009).  
 
Most of the shareholders in Pakistani companies are family members. The board of directors is also 
comprised of family member in mostly. Therefore, nepotism is very common in Pakistani companies because 
of this factor. The directors are given huge salaries with extra benefits (e.g. furnished houses, top of the model 
car, children's educational expenses and medical facilities etc.) that take the major chunk of company's 
earnings. All this reduces the net accounting profit of the company, which leads to a low dividend payout 
ratio. The minority shareholders may suffer as a result of this situation. Mehar (2007) stated that as a result 
of these problems, many of the investors prefer to establish their own companies instead of investing in other 
companies. Despite of the massive work on dividend policy, the researchers could not reach at a consensus. 
Most of the empirical models do not fit the data, so they have a poor predictability. A lot of further research is 
required to reach at a consensus. The current study is also an effort to contribute in this regard.  
 
The current study has twofold significance. At one end, it will educate the investors and management 
practitioners about the existence of earnings management in Pakistani companies. On the other end, it will 
also analyze whether the purpose of earnings management is the dividend policy or otherwise. It is a question 
for practitioners and investors that either earnings management is for avoidance or announcement of the 
dividend payment. This study has four key objectives: (i) to investigate the existence of earnings management 
in Pakistani companies, (ii) to analyze the impact of earnings management on dividend policy, (iii) to examine 
the impact of organizational size on dividend policy, and (iv) to examine the role of ROE in dividend policy 
formulation. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
This section explains the dividend policy, earnings management and their relation in the light of the previous 
studies. The findings of the previous studies and view of different researchers have been discussed in this 
section to have a broader understanding of dividend policy and its relationship with earnings management.  
 
Dividend policy: It is a big challenge for a financial manager to develop a competent dividend policy. This 
policy should be helpful in increasing the confidence of shareholders, and should also be in the best interest 
of the company. Lintner (1956) is one of the pioneers who worked on dividend policy. He investigated how 
corporate managers arrive at the dividend policy. He uncovered that a dividend rate already prevails that act 
as a bench mark for the management. It is very complex decision for the management to reduce dividends. 
Some firms do not pay dividends in their early life cycle, because at that time they are focusing on growth and 
retaining their earnings. According to Miller & Modigliani (1961), dividend policy is not relevant when capital 
markets are assumed to be perfect. Lately, researchers support this evidence like the study conducted by 
Litzenberger & Ramaswamy (1979) showed that dividend policy is relevant if there is presence of market 
imperfections.  
 
The company’s transaction costs would be high for lower agency costs when the chances of dividend 
distribution are high (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The study of Rozeff (1982) is in line with the Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) agency theory that companies decide their dividend to reduce the figure of agency and 
transaction costs related to the recently issued equity. The factors like profitability, debt ratio, growth 
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opportunities, business risk, institutional ownership, and firm size cause variation in dividend payments (Al-
Najjar, 2009). Though better the news, the more will be the dividend (Bhattacharyya, 2007). The signaling 
dividend hypothesis declared that dividend policy provides an indicator about the current performance of the 
firm and its future prophecy (Fairchild, 2010). The free cash-flow hypothesis indicates that agency problems 
among managers and investors are represented by dividend policies (Easterbrook, 1984).  
 
Fuller & Thakor (2002) scribbled down that signaling and free cash flow hypothesis hold much (but not all) of 
the empirical evidence that increase (decrease) in dividend is good (bad) news, leading to stock price 
increases (decreases). The managers of listed firms use cash dividends to report firm’s future performance 
(Lee & Xiao, 2003). The changes in dividend report information about the profitability and indicate about 
company’s future performance (Hussainey & Aal-Eisa, 2009). In many of the developing countries like 
Pakistan, dividend payout ratio is not high enough as compared to the emerging economies (Mehar, 2007).  
The investors will pay a premium for those companies who have stable dividends and reprimand firms that 
reduce dividends (Guttman et al., 2008). These findings support the study of Healy & Palepu (1988). There 
are two important factors of dividend policy i.e. Reluctance to dividend reduction and level of future earnings 
(Bancel, Bhattacharyya, & Mittoo, 2005). According to Brown & Caylor (2006), independent audit committees 
are the key element of quality corporate governance and have a significant relationship with dividend yield. 
There is a positive and significant relationship among the firm performance and quality of corporate 
governance (Javed & Iqbal, 2007). The stock prices of a company are positively associated with its dividend 
policy (Asquith & Mullins, 1983). The stock prices show an increasing trend when there are chances of 
repurchase (Dann (1981; Vermaelen, 1984; Koch & Shenoy, 1999).  
 
Dividend policy of the company shows that to what extent a company will retain its earnings for future 
investments and to what extent it announces its earnings as a dividend (Goshen, 1995). Retained earnings are 
the amount of financing which a company can use without facing competition from other company’s in the 
capital market. Dividend policy depicts the degree to which a company can avoid the examination of investors 
in the capital markets. Some of the inept managers try to avoid their performance analysis by announcing 
fewer dividends, thereby escaping from the external competition. The signaling model by Bhattacharya 
(1979) proposed that managers select dividend payment levels to provide information to market investors.  
When market price of the company’s stock is below intrinsic value, managers are motivated to generate a 
signal of this private information to investors. The dividend announced by the company increase the 
liquidation value of the shares which leads to more firms future earnings (Bhattacharya, 1979). Incremental 
dividend creates positive signal to the firm’s performance and its future cash flows. The firms paying high 
dividend move towards the prosperity and increased level of profitability.  
 
Earnings Management: Earnings management is most highlighting and key issue for the researchers since 
1980s. It is an action of accounting. The use of accounting alternatives to adjust the earnings which have been 
reported by managers for their benefits is termed as earnings management. Extensive literature supports 
that managers can strongly affect reported earnings (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Bushman & Indejejikian, 1993; 
Sloan, 1993; Carpenter & Remmers, 2001; Sloan, 2001). Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal (2005) found in their 
survey that there are five conventional practices of earnings management. These practices include: (i) 
production changes, (ii) timing for the sale of fixed assets to affect gains and losses, (iii) increase in rate of 
sales tax and price discounts to adjust revenue, (iv) amendment in the schedule of shipments, and (v) the 
opportunistic reduction of research and development expenses.  
 
The value of a company is fostered by an increase in earnings. The earnings is managed to recuperate 
shortfall of a company (Hayn, 1995). Liu & Tseng (2004) conducted a study on association between earnings 
management and dividend policy. They used cash dividend payout ratio as a test variable and discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management. The results of their study revealed the fact that companies 
having low payout ratio, have more chances of discretionary accrual, which is a measure of earnings 
management. The earnings management is strongly motivated by agency gaps between shareholders and 
outside investors (Liu & Lu, 2004). Corporate governance is the tool to demote earnings management 
practices. Poor corporate governance creates agency problem which is also a cause of earnings management. 
It is recommended to pay the share of shareholders in terms of dividend to avoid the agency problem (Shah, 
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Yuan & Zafar, 2010). Huai-dong (2000) stated that to reduce earnings management, it is important to 
enhance corporate governance practices.  
 
Dividend Policy and Earnings Management: There is a strong association flanked by dividend policy and 
earnings of the company. The idea of dividend impelling earnings management was first studied by Kasanen 
et al., (1999). According to their findings, high returns have been demanded by the shareholders, expecting 
the smooth dividend gush. Therefore, the companies are encouraged for earnings management to exhibit 
sufficient income to pay dividend. The study of Kato, Kunimura & Yoshida (2001) found some evidences on 
the dividend stimulated earnings management. They also divulged the fact that banks manage their earnings 
to stay on top.  
 
The expectations of shareholders to receive dividend also increases, as a result of increase in reported 
earnings. For the managers, dividend is a real hurdle so that they manage to show fewer earnings. The 
managers can manipulate their earnings to manage regulatory restriction of paying dividend (Edelstein et al, 
2008). They can show less income and more expenses to fulfill this objective. The study of Edelstein et al. 
(2008) supports the findings of Kato et al. (2001) who revealed dividend stirred earnings management, but 
contradictory with the study of Savov (2006) who found in his study that firms holding more investments 
have more chances of discretionary accruals in their earnings. These discretionary accruals are the measure 
of earnings management. Conversely, earnings management practices and investments are found negatively 
related to dividend payouts. Kumar & Lee (2001) stated that there is a systematic connection among stock 
prices and unpredicted changes in dividend. This connection establishes different dividends models through 
which managers devise their strategies to signal the earning prospects of the company. Most of the previous 
researchers (Fama & Babiak, 1968; Brickley, 1983; Aharony & Dotan, 1994; Kumar & Lee, 2001) use the 
Lintner’s (1956) work to evaluate the dividend policy. Lintner (1956) presented a model of partial 
adjustment of dividends. His model was proposed for the smoothing of dividend. The important implication 
of his model is that dividend is continually adjusted with respect to stochastic variation in earnings.  
 
Garret & Priestley (2000) assumed that there is always a target dividend level toward which managers make 
all the adjustments. Their model of dividend behavior suggested that target dividend is a function of lagged 
stock prices and earnings. They empirically proved that dividends signal the shock to the current earnings, 
but they rejected the notion that dividends signal anything about the future earnings. The changes in annual 
dividends and earning move together but there is weak evidence that the information regarding future 
earnings can be disseminated by the dividends (Foerster & Sapp, 2006). However, there is a great support for 
the signaling impact of dividend by many researchers (Kalay & Lowenstein; 1986; Healy & Palepu, 1988; 
Aharony & Dotan, 1994). According to Shah et al., (2010) earnings management does not have any relation 
with the dividend announcement. It is still a controversial issue that dividends signal about permanents 
earnings of the company. This issue needs a lot of further investigation.  
 
The researchers (Brickley, 1983; Healy & Palepu, 1988; Aharony & Dotan, 1994) have provided empirical 
evidences that earnings are directly proportional to dividends. Any increase in the current dividends will lead 
to an increase in future earnings of the company. This notion has been rejected by many researchers (Garret 
& Priestley, 2000). The literature suggests that dividends and earnings are interrelated. Researchers have 
proven that dividends have a signaling power about the future earnings of the company (Aharony & Dotan, 
1994; Kumar & Lee, 2001) and earnings can also predict about the future dividends announced by the firm 
(Fama & Babiak, 1968; Miller & Rock, 1985). 
 
Hypotheses 
  
H1: Dividend policy is not associated with earnings management.  
H2: ROE is positively associated with dividend payment. 
H3: Larger companies pay higher dividends.   
 
3. Methodology 
 
This section explains the research methodology employed to examine the relationship between earnings 
management and dividend policy. 
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Sample: The sample of 86 listed companies on KSE is taken in this study to explore the relationship between 
dividend policy and earnings management. We have used the convenience sampling technique for data 
collection. We have included only non financial companies in this study from different sectors. Data is 
collected from the SBP’s Balance Sheet Analysis, website of Business recorder, and as well as from the annual 
reports of the companies. 
  
Estimation of Earnings Management: Extensive literature has used discretionary accruals as the proxy of 
earnings management. There are several methods to calculate these accruals, which include The Healy Model 
(1985), The Jones Model (1991) and Modified Jones Model (1995). The latest model is Modified Cross 
Sectional Jones Model (1995). Difference between the total accruals and non discretionary accruals is known 
as Discretionary accruals. Firstly, we have calculated total accruals. The literature provides two key 
approaches for this purpose i.e. balance sheet approach and cash flow statement approach. 
 
Balance Sheet Approach: According to this approach, Healey (1985) and Jones (1991) employed the 
following formula to compute total accruals: 
TAit = ΔCAit – ΔCashit – ΔCLit + ΔDCLit - DEPit      (I) 
Where: 
ΔCAit = Change in current assets in year t 
ΔCashit = Change in cash and cash equivalents in year t 
ΔCLit = Change in current liabilities in year t 
ΔDCLit = Change in debt included in the current liabilities in year t 
DEPit = Depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
 
Cash Flows Statement Approach: This is the second approach to calculate total accruals which is easy to 
calculate. 
TAit = NIit - CFOit          (II) 
Where: 
TAit = Total accruals in year t for organization i 
N.Iit = Net Income in year t for organization i 
CFOit = Cash flows from operating activities in year t for organization i 
 
We have followed cash flow statement approach in this study because of its simplicity. Non-discretionary 
accruals have been calculated as follows: 
NDAit = 1[ 
1 
]+ 2 [ 
Revit - R.A. it ]+ 3 [ 
 F.A. it ] (III) 
T.Astit-1 T.Astit-1 T.Astit-1 
 
Where, NDA is non discretionary accruals, Rev is change in revenue in year t, R.A. is change in Receivables, 
T. Ast-1 is total assets in year t-1,  F.A. is change in fixed assets in year t, whereas β1 and β2 are the respective 
coefficients and α is intercept. After computing total accruals and non-discretionary accruals, we have used 
the following equation to find out discretionary accruals: 
DAit = TAit - NDAit          (IV)  
Where: 
TAt = Total Accruals 
NDAt = Non-Discretionary Accruals, 
DAt = Discretionary Accruals 
 
Common Effect Model: We have used the common effect model in panel data analysis to test the research 
hypothesis. 
DPOit = α + ß1DAit + ß2ROEit + ß3Sit + ε it     (IV) 
Where:  
DPO = Dividend Payout 
DA = Discretionary Accrual 
ROE = Return on Equity 
S = Size of Company (Total Assets)  
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4. Results and Discussion 
 
This section provides the results of statistical tests applied to the collected data and discussion in the light of the 
obtained results.  
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The table depicts the values of mean, standard 
error, standards deviation and variance for all the variables.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
  DPO D.A. ROE Size 
Mean       0.48359  0.21759 0.10069 8.06060 
Median       0.08577  0.05786 0.15071 8.11284 
Standard Deviation       2.02844  0.82837 1.16658 1.91330 
Count   430  430 430 430 
 
The mean values for DPO, DA, ROE and Size are 0.48359, 0.21759, 0.10069 and 8.0606 respectively. The 
values of median for DPO, DA, ROE and size are 0.08577, 0.05786, 0.15071 and 8.11284. DPO has a larger 
standard deviation as compared to other variables i.e. 2.02844. The size has the 2nd high standard deviation of 
1.91330. ROE has a standard deviation of 1.91330 and D.A. has a standard deviation of .82837. 
 
We have also checked the multi-colinearity among the variables by applying the correlation. Table 2 is 
showing the correlation matrix. Correlation matrix is showing that all the variables are not highly correlated 
with each other. This low correlation among the variables negates the presence of multi-colinearity in among 
the independent variables.  
 
After applying the correlation and proving the non-presence of multi-colinearity in the data, we have applied 
regression to test our statistical hypothesis. Table 3 is showing the summary of the regression statistics. The 
value of R i.e. simple relationship among the variables is 0.37724. The value of R2 is 0.14231 that means there 
is only 14.231% variation caused by the independent variables in dividend payout ratio. The adjusted R2, a 
better measure than R2, has a lesser value of 0.13627 i.e. 13.627%. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix  
  Dividend D.A. ROE Size 
Dividend 1 
   D.A. -0.01119 1 
  ROE 0.00839 0.04758 1 
 Size  -0.37506 0.07723 0.07620 1 
 
Table 3: Regression Summary Statistics  
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.37724 
R Square 0.14231 
Adjusted R Square 0.13627 
Standard Error 1.88518 
Observations 430 
 
Table 4, the anova table, is providing the value of F-test for the null hypothesis that none of the factors of 
earnings management is related to dividend payout ratio, or in other words that R2 is zero. The null 
hypothesis is rejected here (F (3) = 23.56080, p < 0.05), and it is concluded that at least one of the factors of 
earnings management is related to dividend payout ratio. The model fitness is authenticated as p < 0.05.  
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Table 4: Anova Table for Model Fitness  
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 251.19780 83.73260 23.56080 0.00000 
Residual 426 1513.95915 3.55389 
  Total 429 1765.15694       
 
Table 5 is the coefficient table that shows the estimate of regression coefficients. Standard errors of the 
estimates, t-tests and p values are also given in table 5.  
 
Table 5: Coefficients Table 
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value 
Intercept 3.70818 0.39469 9.39517 0.00000 
D.A. 0.04005 0.11030 0.36308 0.71673 
ROE 0.06347 0.07832 0.81042 0.41815 
Size -0.40192 0.04784 -8.40123 0.00000 
 
The estimated regression coefficients are given under the heading of “Coefficients”. These give, for each of the 
independent variables, the predicted change in the dependent variable when the independent variable is 
increased by one unit conditional on all the other variables in the model remaining constant. The table 5 is 
showing that there would be 4.05% variation in dividend payout ratio, caused by Discretionary Accruals. 
However, this relationship is not very much significant as p > 0.05. The t statistic for this coefficient is 
0.36308 i.e. not significant. So we accept our hypothesis that there is no association between the earnings 
management and dividend payout ratio.  
 
The coefficient of ROE is 0.06347 i.e. showing 6.347% variation in dividend caused by ROE. Its t-statistics is 
0.81042 i.e. insignificant. So we reject the second hypothesis. Higher ROE does not mean that shareholder’s 
will receive higher dividend. The coefficient of size is -0.40192. The negative relationship is showing that 
larger companies pay fewer dividends as compared to the smaller companies. This relationship is significant 
as t-statistics is -8.40123 and p < 0.0001. On the basis of these results H3 is rejected. These results are in 
contradiction with Shah et al., (2010). 
 
The results of common effect model show that there is a positive relationship between dividend payout ratio 
and discretionary accruals. These results are in line with the results of previous studies (Brickley, 1983; Healy 
& Palepu, 1988; Aharony & Dotan, 1994) and contradictory with the results of Savov (2006), who showed 
that there is a negative relationship between dividend policy and earnings management. However, this 
relationship is insignificant which does not authenticate the notion that managers are involved in earnings 
managemnet to make the adjustments in dividident payout. These results are in line with Shah et al., (2010), 
but in contradiction with Edelstein et al., (2008) who said that managers manipulate their earnings for 
making adjustment in dividend payout. It can be concluded from these results that the motive behind the 
earnings management is not the avoidance of dividend only. There could be number of other reasons for the 
earnings management.  
 
The relationship of ROE is also insignificant with dividend payout. It is explained in introductory part of this 
study that most of companies in Pakistan are family owned. Therefore, the dividend payout ratio is not high 
enough despite the company is earning healthy profits. This notion has been proved by the insignificant 
relationship of ROE with dividend payout. This proves that most of the profit is retained for future use. This 
policy can be helpful in stressed market conditions when financing is not very easy. However, minority 
shareholders may suffer due to this restrictive dividend payout policy.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper hypothesizes that earnings management in Pakistani listed companies is not associated with 
dividend payout. To provide supporting evidence, we conducted empirical analyses by using common effect 
model. On the basis of findings of this study, we have concluded the same that discretionary accruals do not 
significantly influence dividend policies. It means that the practices of earnings management are not only for 
the sake of dividend avoidance, but there can be several other reasons for this manipulation.  The investors, 
while making investments decisions with a hope to have dividend, should not focus on the earnings 
management as a signal for the dividend policy formulation. There could be other motive behind the earnings 
management and not the dividend policy. The literature shows that this manipulation is performed possibly 
to cover the shortfall of a company. Similarly, ROE has not any significant relationship with dividend payout. 
  
Further results revealed that there is a positive relationship between small companies and dividend payment. 
This shows that if size of the firm increases then dividend payout will decrease and vice versa. It can be 
concluded that small companies may pay higher dividends in order to attract more investors. However, this 
policy may be detrimental for the small companies. They might be paying dividends at the times when it is 
not suitable to pay. The companies need to review their policy at these times. These companies need to focus 
more on retained earnings than payment of dividends. Otherwise the company will have to rely more on debt 
financing, creating a solvency risk.  
 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Researchers: The current study has been conducted on a 
small sample size i.e. 2004-2009. The future research can be carried out on a more informative sample. 
  
 The present study is not focusing on sectoral differences of earnings management and dividend 
policy. The future research can be conducted while taking these differences in consideration. 
 The future research can also be conducted to make a comparison between the financial and non-
financial companies.  
 This study shows that small companies are paying higher dividends but usually it is always more 
risky to invest in small companies. The future research can be conducted to analyze the involved risk 
in the companies.  
 A cross country analysis can also be performed to have a broader understanding of the relationship 
between earnings management and dividend policy.  
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